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Abstract
Why am I me and not someone else? The answer to this question
seems rather trivial; I am me and not someone else, because otherwise I
would not be me but someone else. Moreover, it seems simply a matter
of necessity that I am identical with myself. On the other hand, I can
easily imagine being someone else. And so it seems I can legitimally
wonder why I am not in fact someone else. This also makes it that
there is a sense of contingency accompanied with the fact that I am this
particular human being rather than another. But how can we reconcile
this sense of contingency with regard to the particular being each of
us happens to be and the apparent platitude that I am necessarily
identical with myself? In the following sections I will discuss this
problem and other issues that surround it.
1 The business of being someone
That I am this living self-conscious entity, right here and right now, seems to
me one of the most basic facts that I know of. Indeed my very life consists in
this fact. If it were not for this fact, nothing else could ever really matter to
me. Yet given that there are more self-conscious entities like me out there in
the world, it comes to me as rather arbitrary that, of all these self-conscious
living entities, I happen to be this particular self-conscious entity rather
than another. So why is it that I am me rather than someone else? Before
we go into this question, let us rst try to make more clear what is involved
in this business of being a self-conscious entity.
In his famous article `What Is it Like to Be a Bat?' Nagel argues that
for some x to be conscious there must be something it is like for x to be
x. Nagel also refers to this as the \subjective character of experience".1
Another popular way of characterizing consciousness in this way is to say
that consciousness is essentially `qualitative' or `phenomenal'. Although in-
tuitively appealing, I nd these characterizations not wholly satisfying. The
reason for this is that to me it is not clear what the necessary and su-
cient conditions are under which something may be counted as `qualitative'.
If this is not well-articulated, then there might as well be something it is
like to be a rock; being a rock then is like nothing at all. A better way
1Thomas Nagel, `What Is It Like to Be a Bat?', [27]
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to characterize consciousness might be to say that it is simply the sense of
existence. On the other hand attempting to dene consciousness in order to
inform someone about its nature simply seems futile; only beings that are
conscious can know what it is. And because I assume that my readers are
all self-conscious beings, it is a waste of energy to put too much eort in
conveying what it is like to be conscious.
Now, for human beings like you and me, being conscious of ourselves
and the world seems essentially to be accompanied by perceptions, thoughts
and emotions. And indeed, these all have their own particular qualitative
characters; there is a world of dierence between what it is like to see and
what it is like to hear, and the same holds for the dierence between feeling
pain and feeling pleasure. And in that sense we can indeed say that `there
is something it is like' to be a human being.
An important feature of our perceptions, thoughts, and emotions is that
they are private to ourselves, i.e. they are only accessible via the particular
rst-person perspectives that each of us uniquely occupy. Moreover, we
can never be mistaken as to whom it is that is having these perceptions,
thoughts, and emotions. When I look at my laptop, there is no room for
doubt as to whether I am looking at my laptop or someone else. This
epistemic fact about our conscious states is called by Sydney Shoemaker
`immunity to error through misidentication'.2 More about this later.
To the extent that our individual lives essentially consist of the percep-
tions, thoughts, and emotions we have, our very lives are essentially private
to us. After all, these are only accessible, or experienced, from our own
unique rst-person perspective. This means that having this rather than
that rst-person perspective, is what makes us being this rather than that
human being. And so the fact that I am me and not someone else is con-
stituted by the particular rst-person perspective, this particular point of
view, that I happen to occupy.
2 A Modal Paradox?
Now that we have established a close connection between the fact of who
we are and the particular rst-person perspective that we occupy, let us
look more closely at the central question of this essay: why am I me and
not someone else? Of course, this question does not only pertain to me in
particular; anyone whose being is dened by a particlar point of view can ask
his or her self this question. In the following however, I will often adress the
question from my own point of view. But bear in mind that my questions
equally apply to anyone else endowed with a rst-person perspective.
2See `Self-Reference and Self-Awareness', [32]
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At a rst glance, the answer to the question `why am I me and not some-
one else?' seems simple: I am me and not someone else because otherwise
I would not be me but someone else. And so it seems that me being me
seems a matter of sheer necessity. Still, it seems that I can easily imagine
that I could have been someone else. I can imagine having been the son of
other parents, born in a dierent country several centuries ago. So at the
same time, there is a sense of contingency with respect to the fact that of
all persons, I happen to be this particular person. But how can we reconcile
this sense of contingency with the fact that I am necessarily identical to
myself? How can we account for this seeming paradox?
The sense of contingency that accomponies the simple fact that I hap-
pen to be me, is not solely facilitated by the imagination. In fact, there is
another way in to this. To demonstrate this, I will again draw on Thomas
Nagel's work. In chapter IV , `The Objective Self, from The View From
Nowhere Nagel sets out a problem closely related to our own:
One acute problem of subjectivity remains even after all points of
view and subjective experiences are admitted to the real world{
after the world is conceded to be full of people with minds, hav-
ing thoughts, feelings, and perceptions that cannot be completely
subdued by the physical conception of objectivity. This general
admission still leaves us with an unsolved problem of particular
subjectivity. The world so conceived, though extremely various
in the types of things and perspectives it contains, is still center-
less. It contains us all, and none of us occupies a metaphysically
privileged position. Yet each of us, reecting on this centerless
world, must admit that one very large fact seems to have been
omitted from its description: the fact that a particular person in
it is himself.3
Nagel's problem seems to come down to this: given a complete objective
description of the world, i.e. a description solely consisting of third-personal
facts, it seems impossible for me to deduce that I in fact am one of the par-
ticular creatures mentioned in that description.4 Altough such a description
contains, on the face of it, everything there is to know about Tim Klaassen
3See The View From Nowhere [28, p. 54]
4Thus Nagel's problem is not the same problem that I am adressing here (the problem
of why I am me rather than someone else). Nagel is concerned with the problem that
third-person descriptions of the world, that purport to be complete, in fact seem to leave
something out, i.e. the fact of occupying a certain point of view. Nagel's problem, I
think, is essentially epistemological while the problem with which I am concerned is of a
more metaphysical nature. The solution that Nagel proposes to his own problem is quite
interesting. He says that in order to make our picture of the world complete, one must
somehow succesfully integrate both the objective and subjective realms into a coherent
whole. The solution he proposes is that an objective world conception can only be con-
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(e.g. that my date of birth is 15   02   1989, that my parents are called
Marco and Ans, that my favorite food is fries with lamb chops, that my cur-
rent girlfriend is from the city of Huelva in Spain, and even that I am having
the thought P and the perception S at time t etc.), I will never come to
learn that I, as a matter of fact, am Tim Klaassen. Now if, from a complete
objective description of the world it does not follow that I in fact am Tim
Klaassen, might we not conclude that, therefore, I am not Tim Klaassen
necessarily but only contingently?
I must admit that this conclusion might not be wholly warranted from
the premises from which it is drawn. It might simply be a category mistake
to suppose that the modal conditions under which I am Tim Klaassen can
be decided upon on the basis of an objective third-personal description of
the world. Moreover, Nagel's intention is merely to show that it is wrong
to suppose that everything there is to know lends itself for being captured
in a purely objective picture of the world. Consequently, if Nagel is right, a
complete objective description of the world might indeed leave out a whole
body of modal facts, such as the, possibly necessary, fact that I am me.
In any case however, if the knowledge that I am Tim Klaassen cannot be
acquired by me on the basis of an objective desciption of the world, it is
certain that by means of such a description I also cannot decide upon its
modal status. And so we are left with the problem of how we can otherwise
nd out about the modal status of occupying a certain point of view rather
than another. In any case, conceiving the world objectively does seem to
foster the sense of contigency that is accompanied by the fact that I am Tim
Klaassen
It is interesting by the way to see that the modal problem that is in-
volved in occupying a certain rst-person perspective, can be seen as part
of the much more general problem of accommodating subjective conscious
phenomena within a physical worldview. In the article that I have already
mentioned (What It Is Like to Be a Bat?), Nagel argues that the body of
knowledge that the physical sciences provide us with is not able even in
principle to capture the existence of conscious phenomena. Frank Jackson
refers to this as the Modal Argument, which argues that no amount of phys-
ical knowledge ever logically entails the presence of conscious phenomena.5
This is also more commonly refered to as the `Zombie Hypothesis' which
states that it is possible that certain organisms could be physically identical
to us whithout being consciousness.6
ceived by an Objective Self, i.e. a subject that is not tied to any point of view. Although
I think Nagel's solution has problems, I will not go into it. However, for a criticism of
Nagel and an alternative solution see `The Sense of Identity' by John Perry, [29]. See also
Velleman's essay `Self to Self', [37]
5See `Epiphenomenal Qualia', [15]
6The most systemtic account of this idea was given by David Chalmers in his book
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, [5]. But for other versions of
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Another way of saying all this is that there seems to be an explanatory
gap in case we suppose conscious phenomena to be the explanandum and a
body of physical facts to be the explanans; it seems that only by making a
leap of faith we can arrive at the rst from the latter.7
Now in the lines quoted above, Nagel seems to argue that even if we
suppose that this gap has succesfully been bridged, i.e. that we have suc-
cesfully accomodated conscious phenomena within an objective worldview,
it would still say nothing about the fact that, for example, I happen to be
Tim Klaassen. So it seems then that even if we bridge this initial gap and
solve the so-called Hard Problem of consciousness, there is still another gap
that also needs to be bridged.8 And this is the gap between the existence of
conscious phenomena in general and the fact that they are distributed in a
way such that some of these conscious phenomena belong to me instead of
someone else. And so accounting for the fact that I am me and not some-
one else might be considered to be even harder than the conventional hard
problem of consciousness.9
Moreover, it seems that this problem is quite independent from the spe-
cic metaphysical commitments that we make, such as the commitment to
physicalism. For even if we admit that the mind is an altogether dierent
substance from the physical, there still remains the problem of why I am
this mental substance rather than another. Of course, this may cause the
suspicion that there is something wrong with the problem itself; i.e. that
there might in fact be no problem at all. However, I shall dismiss this thesis
for the time being because I think there are a lot more interesting things
left to explore in connection to our problem.
3 Changing Perspectives
In the previous section I indicated that to the question `why am I me and
not someone else' corresponds a relatively simple answer: I am me and
not someone else because otherwise I would not be me but someone else.
The answer mentions a counter-factual situation (indicated by the word
`otherwise') in which I am not me but someone else. And therefore the
question really comes down to why it is that this counter-factual situation
the same idea see e.g. [1], [2], [3], and [16]. For a criticism see e.g. [10], [11], [12], [33] and
[34]
7The term `explanatory gap' was rst coined by Joseph Levine in his article `Materi-
alism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap', [19]
8David Chalmers was the rst to introduce a distinction between the easy problems
and the hard problems of consciousness. See his article `Facing Up to the Problem of
Consciousness', [4]
9I was happy to see that at least someone else shares my intuition that here we are
dealing with an even harder problem. See Tim Roberts' article `The Even Harder Problem
of Consciousness', [31].
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does not in actual fact obtain. However, as soon as we think about what
is involved in this supposedly counter-factual situation we seem to be faced
with certain perplexities.
As we have seen there is a close connection between the particular being
that we are and the particular rst-person perspective that accompanies it.
Let us suppose that who I am is identical with the rst-person perspective
that I occupy; i.e. my being is dened by my particular rst-person per-
spective.10 Now let us think about the counter-factual situation in which
I am not me but someone else. It seems that in such a counter-factual
world I would occupy a dierent rs-person perspective than the one I oc-
cupy in the actual world. Also, in the counter-factual world that we want
to describe, someone else would occupy the rst-person perspective that I
currently have (or rather am). Moreover, every human being that exists in
the actual world also exists in our hypothetical world, the only dierence
being a kind of shuing of rst-person perspectives.
Now let us again take the complete objective description of the world
that Nagel envisaged. It seems that to our counter-factual world, in which
each of us occupies an alternative rst-person perspective, there would also
correspond such a complete objective description. But how would such a
description look like? It seems that such a description would be wholly
identical to the objective description of our actual world! After all it would
consist of the same set of human beings and the specic rst-person per-
spectives that belong to them. So although for us individually being another
rst-person perspective would seem to make all the dierence in the world,
objectively everything would remain exactly the same. Moreover, in the
counter-factual world that we are trying to describe, the human being that
is Tim Klaassen would also at a certain point be thinking and worrying
about this peculiar problem of rst-person perspectives in the exact same
way as I am doing now! But then how do I know that this supposedly
counter-factual situation does not in actual fact obtain after all?
Of course if you think about it, the whole idea of switching identities (i.e.
swiching rst-person perspectives), seems already very dubious in the rst
place. For what could it possibly mean to switch idententities? Normally
when we think about switching identities we envisage something along the
lines of what happens in movies such as Face/O. In this movie, FBI Special
Agent Sean Archer (John Travolta) undergoes a face-transplant, adopting
the face of the terrorist Castor Troy (Nicolas Cage) which he tries to capture.
In this situation we might say that Special Agent Archer takes on the identity
of the terrorist Troy. But one could also say that already by being movie-
actors Travolta and Cage take on dierent identities. There are many more
examples, such as for example a spy that takes on a dierent identity. And
in the case of people that have multiple personality disorder we might also
10See also [24]
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think there is a switching of (personal) indentities. But in all such cases there
is a self-same entity involved that undergoes the change. However, when we
think of changing identities in an absolute sense, it is a lot more dicult
to understand what exactly it is that such change would consist in. This
has to do with the fact that in case of changing identities absolutely, there
seems to be no room for anything undergoing that change. This diculty
is illustrated by the fact that the objective world descriptions of the actual
world and the counter-factual world from the previous paragraph are wholly
identical.
Be that as it may, it is an indubitable fact that my rst-person per-
spective is dierent from the rst-person perspective of any other human
being, and it seems there would be a change in the world if all of a sudden
my rst-person perspective would be replaced by another one. The di-
culty is understanding what this would involve given the assumption that
my identity is entirely constituted by my particular rst-person perspective.
It may seem that the whole issue would be less dicult if we proceed from
the assumption that, in addition to our rst-person perspective, each of us
really is a kind of distinct subject capable of being attached to other rst-
person perspectives. But then again, as I have already shown, in that case
we would still be left with the problem of why one is this particular subject
rather than another.
In the thought experiment that we just conducted I posited the diculty
that, in case our counter-factual world actually became a reality, we might
not be able to notice any dierence even from or own point of view. After
all, in the counter-factual situation someone else would come to occupy my
current rst-person perspective, and it seems that the other person would
be having the exact same experiences as I am having right now; the other
person would be sitting behind my desk writing this essay at this very mo-
ment, having the exact same thoughts, feelings, and emotions that I am
having now. So in case our counter-factual world would become actual, not
only would there be no change objectively, the world would also be, from
our own point of view, wholly indistinguishable subjectively. Could it be
that a metaphysical change in the distribution of rst-person perspectives
is simply epistemologically inaccessible to us?
4 The spatio-temporal properties of the rst-person
perspective
In The View From Nowhere Nagel contends that the two propositions `I am
Tim Klaassen' and `Tim Klaassen is Tim Klaassen' have essentially dierent
contents. The idea is that `I am Tim Klaassen' contains epistemic data
that is not captured by the seemingly identical statement `Tim Klaassen
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is Tim Klaassen'. And because only the latter kind of propositions seem
to consitute a third-person description of the world, we can expect such a
description to be incomplete. However, although he will eventually refute
it, Nagel also considers an objection to the idea that `I am Tim Klaassen'
and `Tim Klaassen is Tim Klaassen' express dierent truths:
The objection is this. Only someone who misunderstands the
logic of the rst person can believe that \I am TN" states an
important truth that cannot be stated witouth the rst person.
When we look at the actual use of that form of words, we see that
altough it is a special kind of statement, it states no special kind
of truth{for it is governed by truth-conditions that are entirely
expressible without indexicals.11
However, Nagel dismisses this objection by pointing out a very interest-
ing analogy:
My objection to this semantic diagnosis is that it doesn't make
the problem go away.
It should be a sign of something wrong with the argument that
the corresponding semantic point about \now" would not defuse
someone's puzzlement about what kind of fact it is that a par-
ticular time is the present. The truth-conditions of tensed state-
ments can be given in tenseless terms, but that does not remove
the sense that a tenseless description of the history of the world
(including the description of people's tensed statements and their
truth values) is fundamentally incomplete, because it cannot tell
us which time is the present.12
Just as from a complete objective description of the world I cannot de-
duce which particular human being I am, I also cannot deduce from such a
description which time it is that is the actual present.13 Could it be that
these two problems are in fact related to each other?
Taking up the world from a certain point of view always seem to take
place within the here and now of the present moment. In Being No-One
Thomas Metzinger even considers this one of the very essential features by
which the rst-person perspectives is constituted. He even writes that \One
may even go so far as to say that, at its core, phenomenal consciousness is
precisely this: the generation of an island of presence in the continuous ow
of physical time."14
11The View From Nowhere,[28, p. 58]
12The View From Nowhere,[28, p. 59]
13For some articles on this problem of time see e.g. [23], [13], and [25]
14Being No-One:The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity, [26, p.126]
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Of course not only is our rst-person perspective always accompanied by
the temporal present; it is also always centered around a spatial here. And
indeed, I think that the problems of the rst-person perspective that we have
been dealing with are in fact closely related to certain philosophical problems
surrounding space and time. As a matter of fact, this relation has already
been investigated by several other authors as well. In John Smythies' article
`Space, Time, and Consciousness' for example, considerable attention is paid
to the possible role of consciousness in generating phenomenal time in the
block-universe that is described by the theory of special relativity.15 More-
over, as early as the 17th century the intimate connection between space,
time and consciousness was also already ingeniously set out by Leibniz.16
In fact, Leibniz may provide us with a lot of interesting material to work
with when dealing with the problems that surround the rst-person per-
spective. This is because according to Leibniz's metaphysical conception
of the world, reality consists solely of individual points of view and their
perceptions (so-called `Monads' ). Moreover, Leibniz presents us with prob-
lems about the nature of space and time (which according to him are really
types of relations that hold between the monads) that are very similar to the
problems that we saw with the supposedly counter-factual worlds that, on
closer inspection, seem objectively and subjectively indistinguishable from
the actual world.
According to Leibniz space and time are really relations that hold be-
tween the totality of points of view that make up the universe. This is
contrary to the Newtonian absolute conception of space and time accord-
ing to which the spatio-temporal location of a particular body is absolutely
determined independent of all other existing things. This means that a Leib-
nizian spatio-temporal order can only be altered by changing the relations
that internally exist between the things that constitute that order. So ac-
cording to Leibniz, we might initially naively imagine that a counter-factual
world in which the spatio-temporal order of our actual world is rotated by
180 degrees and in which the moment of the big bang occurs one million
years earlier, is really an altogether dierent world from our own. How-
ever, in this supposedly counter-factual world the spatio-temporal relations
that exist between the things that consititute it would remain identical to
those of our actual world. And therefore, according to Leibniz, this sup-
posedly counter-factual world would not be dierent at all from our actual
world; i.e. it would suppose \a change without any change".17 Does this not
seem very similar to our own counter-factual thought experiment in which
15Space, Time, and Consciousness, [35]. For other articles that concern themselves with
the relationship between rst-personal consciousness and spatio-temporality see e.g. [36],
[38], [22], and [30]
16See especially his Discourse on Metaphysics, [17, p. 35-68], and the famous Leibniz-
Clarke Correspondence, [18]
17The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondance, [17, p. 38]
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a supposed shue of rst-person perspectives also does not amount to any
change, either objectively or subjectively?
Of course, Leibniz's account seems to be facing similar problems when
it comes to the fact that I happen to be Tim Klaassen and that this time
happens to be the present. But with Leibniz's metaphysics, which I have
only touched upon very supercally, the interesting thing is that both of
these facts get metaphysically combined into one.18
5 Back to the sense of contingency
The issues we have come across in the previous sections all seem to indicate
that, given the way the world is, it is an inescapable fact that I am experienc-
ing the world from this particular point of view. That is, it seems necessary
that I am having this particular point of view rather than an other. And
on the face of it, this should have been expected al along: if `Tim Klaassen
is Tim Klaassen' is necessarily true, then whomever is Tim Klaassen is nec-
essarily Tim Klaassen. And because I in fact am Tim Klaassen, I am Tim
Klaassen necessarily.
On the other hand, I simply cannot rid myself entirely of the sense that
somehow there is a kind of contingency involved in all this. But how can we
account for this?
When I imagine a world in which I occupy another rst-person perspec-
tive, I imagine myself to be conscious in a dierent place and a dierent time.
In such an alternative universe a whole dierent corner of the world presents
itself to me. Moreover, I am a dierent being with a dierent history. In
short, I am a dierent organism altogether.
18A speculative remark: if I understand Einstein's Theory of Relativity correctly, it
seems that the Einsteinian world-view can be seen as providing us with our own con-
temporary counterpart of these issues. As far as I understand, Einstein, in his short
work Relativity: The Special and General Theory, seems to say that the results of spatio-
temporal measurments depend on the reference frame from which the scientic observer
is doing his measurings,[14, p. 27-30]. And so it seems that the particular here and now
from which the scientist operates, has a substantial impact on the facts that he comes up
with. So here again we see a close relationship between space-time and the rst-person
perspective. If my interpretation is correct, then the very notion of a complete objective
decpription of the world { according to Nagel a description that is essentially centerless {
may itself even become somewhat problematic. The reason for this is that such a suppos-
edly centerless conception seems in the end thoroughly shaped by the point of view from
which it is conceived. The following quote from the physicist Paul Davies may provide
some support for this claim: \The essential element injected into physics by the theory
of relativity is subjectivity. Fundamental things like duration, length, past, present and
future can no longer be regarded as a dependable framework within which to live our lives.
Instead, they are exible, elastic qualities, and their values depend on precisely who is
measuring them. In this sense the observer is beginning to play a rather central role in
the nature of theworld. It has become meaningless to ask whose clock is\really" right,
or what is the\real" distance between two places, or what is happening on Mars \now."
There is no \real" duration, extension or common present." [8, p. 42]
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Now, the sense of contigency that befalls me when I think of the idea
that I might have been someone else, seems to be caused by the idea that I
remain the same entity relative to this change of the rst-person perspective.
I imagine that, if right now my current point of view were to be replaced
by another one, I would still retain some memory of myself occupying my
former point of view; I would think by myself \He, I have become the per-
son occupying this other point of view!" In other words, I would notice a
dierence, contrary to what we have argued for in the previous sections.
The sense of contingency, in this case, seems to be brought about by the
dualistic intuition that apart from the presentational content that consti-
tutes my particular rst-person perspective, I also am a separate perceiving
subject that is able to \consider itself as istself " apart from that presen-
tational content.19 There is the sense that I, as this particular perceiving
subject, am only contingently related to the perceptions that happen to con-
stitute my view of the world. Or to put it in a dierent way, I seem to think
of myself as a person inhabiting this body as a matter of mere contigency.20
In this way, it does seem to make sense to ask oneself `why am I me and not
someone else?' if this is taken to mean `why am I, as this particular subject,
occupying this body and not some other subject?' Again however, it seems
that it would still remain somewhat of a mystery why I am the particular
subject that I am rather than another.
Because we are talking about points of view here, it is not at all strange
to think that occupying one of those points of view in particular comes
across as a matter of contigency. After all, talk about points of view seem
to involve a distinction between the view and the viewer. Or to put it in more
traditional terms; a point of view really is composed of a set of perceived
objects and a subject that is perceiving them. Furthermore, thinking of a
point of view as being occupied also generates the sense that there is in
addition something that is occupying it. And because we seem to be dealing
here with two separate things, we understand their union as merely optional.
This dual aspect is also phenomenologically obvious from the perspective
of our own individual point of view as well. From within my point of view
there is always a world that presents itself to me. Moreover, it presents the
world to me as being a certain way ; the world that I take up from my point
of view is dened by certain presentational contents. However, not only is
it the world that is consciously taken in as a fact, but also the fact that it
is taken in from this point of view by me. So every time that x is visually
presented to me, I also see that it is me to whom x is visually presented. So
19An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, [21, p. 204]
20In `Counterparts of Persons and their Bodies' David Lewis puts forward an argument
for the idea that persons and bodies indeed are in fact only contingently identical. I have
to confess however, that I am not quite sure if I understand the argument that is put forth
in the article. However, given the thesis that is spelled out by Lewis, it seems appropriate
to put a reference to it here.[20]
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an essential part of the presentational content that constitutes my point of
view is the circumstance that I am the subject of that content. 21
The sense of contingency is furnished by the apparent subject-object
division that forms the general structure of the presentational content that
makes up my point of view. Through our perspective of the world we are
not only made aware of the world, but we also become aware of the fact
that we are there to perceive it. In fact, and this is related to Shoemaker's
notion of immunity to error that I already mentioned at the beginning, it
is absolutely self-evident that, in my own case, it is me who is doing the
observing.
Because I, as the subject, am also part of the presentational content that
constitutes my point of view, I am at once subject and object to myself. So
in addition to my thoughts, emotions, and my perceptions of the external
world, I myself am also presented as an object within the connes of my
particular point of view. And this further adds to the sense of contigency
that is involved in grasping the fact that I happen to be Tim Klaassen.
When I think about myself as the subject of my perceptions, I become
a kind of object to myself. But in this act of cognizing myself there seems
to occur yet another kind of subject/object distinction. And this makes it
that not only I can imagine that I could have had dierent perceptions from
the ones I currently have, but also that this object, that I conceive of when
I think about myself as subject, could have been dierent.
However, if the presentational contents of a particular point of view are
wholly dened not only by the objects that appear in it, but also by the
particular subject that is perceiving them, it is not dicult to see that no
two subjects could ever have access to the same point of view. For even if
it is metaphysically possible for two subjects to occupy each other's point
of view, the very presentational contents by which these points of view are
dened, would immediately be altered. And consequently, I could never
enter another subject's point of view without changing the contents of that
point of view. The only way in which I could experience another one's point
of view is to become the other one. But in this case, it would not be me
who is experiencing that point of view, but the other. And thus, we would
suppose a change in perspective without any change.
It seems then that the sense of contingency that accompanies the fact
that I am Tim Klaassen is really illusory. Wherever there exists the self-
conscious human being that is Tim Klaassen, I am necessesarily there,
present to his point of view. And this gives my existence a very real and
robust quality. No matter what, as long as Tim Klaassen is alive, I am here
and no one else. It could not be otherwise.
21See also e.g. [7], [26], and [21]. For a criticism see [6], [10], and [9]
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